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Studying the way athletes predict actions of their peers during fast-ball sports,
such as a tennis, has proved to be a valuable tool for increasing our knowledge
of intention understanding. The working model in this area is that the anticipatory
representations of others’ behaviors require internal predictive models of actions formed
from pre-established and shared representations between the observer and the actor. This
model also predicts that observers would not be able to read accurately the intentions
of a competitor if the competitor were to perform the action without prior knowledge
of their intention until moments before the action. To test this hypothesis, we recorded
brain activity from 25 male tennis players while they performed a novel behavioral tennis
intention inference task, which included two conditions: (i) one condition in which they
viewed video clips of a tennis athlete who knew in advance where he was about to
act/serve (initially intended serves) and (ii) one condition in which they viewed video
clips of that same athlete when he did not know where he was to act/serve until the
target was specified after he had tossed the ball into the air to complete his serve
(non-initially intended serves). Our results demonstrated that (i) tennis expertise is related
to the accuracy in predicting where another server intends to serve when that server
knows where he intends to serve before (but not after) he tosses the ball in the air;
and (ii) accurate predictions are characterized by the recruitment of both cortical areas
within the human mirror neuron system (that is known to be involved in higher-order
(top-down) processes of embodied cognition and shared representation) and subcortical
areas within brain regions involved in procedural memory (caudate nucleus). Interestingly,
inaccurate predictions instead recruit areas known to be involved in low-level (bottom-up)
computational processes associated with the sense of agency and self-other distinction.
Keywords: embodied cognition, biosocial interaction, dyads, intention understanding, shared representation,
fMRI, social neuroscience, mirror neuron system
INTRODUCTION
“If there is something you don’t want to be on a tennis court, it is
predictable,”
John McEnroe, ESPN, U.S Open, 8-30-13.
The way in which athletes read and anticipate the actions of their
opponent during fast-ball sports, such as a tennis, is a challenging
and complex process that is a remarkable feat in itself. A tennis
player’s ability to predict an opponent’s intentions quickly and
accurately is particularly important during the return of serves,
where the time required to plan and initiate a response typically
exceeds the flight time for the ball (Glencross and Cibich, 1977;
Farrow and Abernethy, 2003; Williams et al., 2004; Wright and
Jackson, 2007). Given the high speed a ball can reach nowadays
(e.g., above 130mph), the receiver must make a decision regard-
ing the direction of his/her opponent’s serve intentions (e.g., to
serve to the center of the tennis court or T, the middle of the ser-
vice box, or the wide side of the service box) based, at least in
part, on information identified prior to the server striking the ball
(Wright and Jackson, 2007).
Several studies have investigated the mechanisms underly-
ing predictive motor skills in such time-constrained situations
(Williams et al., 2004). For instance, it has been shown that
expert tennis players, when compared to their less skilled counter-
parts, are: (i) better at detecting advance (i.e., early or pre-event)
information from an opponent’s postural orientation (Williams
et al., 2002); (ii) have more efficient visual search behaviors
(Goulet et al., 1988, 1992; Singer et al., 1996; Helsen and Starkes,
1999; Overney et al., 2008); (iii) pay more attention to motion
information (Williams et al., 2002); and (iv) possess greater
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knowledge/expertise of situational probabilities (Williams et al.,
2004). Although the past decade has been characterized by a
growing body of research dedicated to better understand the fac-
tors playing a role in anticipation and predictive skills in fast-ball
sports, very few studies have examined their underlying neural
mechanisms (e.g., Wright and Jackson, 2007). Among these stud-
ies, Wright and Jackson (2007) used temporal occlusion to study
the neural bases of action prediction in fast-ball sports. Relative to
a passive condition, action prediction recruited notably a fronto-
parietal network (Wright and Jackson, 2007), which is known
to involve the putative human mirror neuron system (hMNS;
Grafton et al., 1996; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2008; Rizzolatti and
Fogassi, 2014). They extended this result by demonstrating that
experts, compared to novices, tend to show stronger brain activa-
tion within the hMNS for early-occluded than for late-occluded
time sequences of a tennis shot (Wright and Jackson, 2007).
Theories of simulation and embodied cognition provide a neu-
ral basis for such early predictive ability in experts by specifying
the involvement (and re-activation) of the inferior fronto-parietal
network (possibly including the hMNS), which is known to be
activated by one’s own motor performance as well as perspec-
tive taking, sensorimotor integration, and procedural memory
(Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Blakemore and Decety, 2001; Ruby and
Decety, 2001; Ruby et al., 2002; Buccino et al., 2004; Rizzolatti
and Sinigaglia, 2007, 2008; Grafton, 2009; Grafton et al., 2009;
Ortigue et al., 2009a,b, 2010a; Juan et al., 2013; Tomeo et al.,
2013; Rizzolatti and Fogassi, 2014). Such research has highlighted
two overlapping neural networks, known as the action obser-
vation network (AON) and the social network (SN), that are
differentially involved in the process of understanding inten-
tions and actions (Grafton, 2009; Ortigue et al., 2009a,b, 2010a;
Juan et al., 2013). The AON, which contains a subset of regions
within the hMNS including the posterior superior temporal sul-
cus (STS), the inferior parietal lobule, and the inferior frontal
gyrus, has been linked to perception of actions and understand-
ing intentions utilizing embodied cognition (Grafton et al., 1996;
Desmurget and Grafton, 2000; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004;
Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2007, 2008; Desmurget et al., 2009). On
the other hand, the SN includes the medial prefrontal cortex, STS,
precuneus, insula, and amygdala, and has been linked to per-
ceiving biological motion and theory of mind attribution (Frith
and Frith, 1999; Allison et al., 2000; Wheatley et al., 2007; Decety
and Cacioppo, 2012). Theories of embodied cognition and sim-
ulation suggest that the emulation of these two brain networks
contributes to the capacity to read and predict the intentions of
others.
Although embodied cognition is not a prerequisite to act or
to understand others’ actions, simulation theories suggest that
the more these observed actions are congruent with integrated
templates of past self-related motor experiences, the easier it is
to read these observed actions and intentions as the actor and
the observer share a mental map of the action (Niedenthal et al.,
2005; Niedenthal, 2007). In line with this, the model of shared
representation suggests that sport mates or close partners develop
a “transactive” mental representation of their self while acing—
a mental representation that calls for cognitive interdependence
and includes a structure of stored information across the two
individuals (Wegner et al., 1985; Ortigue et al., 2010b). Cognitive
interdependence in dyads relates to the concept of inclusion of the
other in the self-mental representation—a concept that is closely
tied to self-expansion mechanisms, and embodied cognition.
Although we are all interdependent to some degree, the model
of shared representation highlights the extent to which partners
may implicitly read and influence each other’s perceptions of
their actions, emotions, and intentions. Cognitive interdepen-
dence can provide a processing advantage during anticipatory
representations of others’ behaviors, such that sport mates (e.g.,
competitors) are more efficient and more frequently success-
ful in forming shared mental representations based on internal
predictive models of actions (Ruscher et al., 2003).
In the context of sport athletes, intention understanding
among peers is based, in part, upon a shared mental represen-
tation of actions, with sport mates being able to better antici-
pate one another’s actions due to greater experience observing
each other’s actions in different situations or due to shared
experience in a specific sport (Wegner et al., 1985; Hommel
et al., 2001; Ruscher et al., 2003; Agnew and Etcheverry, 2006).
As an illustrative case in point, previous studies have demon-
strated that experts in a sport (e.g., basketball, dance, or soc-
cer) are better and/or faster (than novices) at understanding
intentions of an opponent or a teammate just by watching
their body movements (Jeannerod, 2001; Wolpert et al., 2003;
Calvo-Merino et al., 2005; Cross et al., 2006, 2009; Aglioti
et al., 2008; Abreu et al., 2012; Tomeo et al., 2013). Moreover,
evidence suggests that intention perception may be facilitated
not only by congruence between observed and past actions
(Niedenthal et al., 2005; Niedenthal, 2007; Aglioti et al., 2008;
Ortigue et al., 2010a,b; Tomeo et al., 2013), but also by the
emotional bond between actor and perceiver, with a stronger
bond associated with better (Cutting and Kozlowski, 1977) or
faster intention understanding (Ortigue et al., 2010b). This
facilitation effect putatively occurs through a direct, fast and
automatic visuo-motor matching process between what the
experts see and what they have executed (over and over) in the
past.
Reciprocally, this model of shared representation predicts that
this facilitation effect fades away when an actor plans their actions
with an unusual mental representation of their intentions (as it
can be the case in fool actions). In a recent behavioral study,
Tomeo and colleagues tested this notion by manipulating the
congruence between a soccer kicker’s bodily movements and
the subsequent ball trajectory and investigated the prediction
performance from 16 kickers, 16 goalkeepers, and 16 novices
(Experiment 1; Tomeo et al., 2013). Their results showed that
kickers were more often fooled than goalkeepers and novices
during incongruent actions, although both types of experts (kick-
ers and goalkeepers) outperformed novices (Tomeo et al., 2013).
This study reinforced the model of shared representation by
demonstrating that: (i) shared expertise plays a crucial role in
intention anticipation (which has also been demonstrated previ-
ously by a large body of work), and that (ii) previously shared
mental representation among peers (kickers-to-kickers) may hin-
der intention anticipation when one of them performs deceptive
actions. However, because an actor always knows in advance what
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their intentions are (whether they are deceptive intentions or
not) and so may display visual cues that are shared with their
observers, one may argue that this study does not fully test the
model of shared intentions.
To address this argument, we designed a novel behavioral
intention inference task (IIT), which included two conditions: (i)
one condition showing video clips of an unfamiliar right-handed
tennis athlete (hereafter the server) who knew in advance where
he was about to act/serve (initially intended action, IIS condition;
see Supplementary Movie 1 for a sample) and (ii) another con-
dition showing video clips of that same athlete when he did not
know in advance where he was about to act/serve (non-initially
intended serve, NIIS condition; see Supplementary Movie 2 for
a sample). In this NIIS condition, an experimenter (NP) told
the server where to serve (either to the center of the tennis
court or to the wide side of the service box) after he had
tossed the ball into the air to serve. Although the voice of
the experimenter, NP, was recorded in each video for qual-
ity and accuracy control purposes, participants watched silent
video clips. In all video clips the server bounced the ball twice,
tossed the ball, and finally stroke it to perform a series of
serves.
We recorded brain activity from 25 male tennis experts (here-
after, the observers) while they were performing this tennis IIT
(tIIT; Figure 1) and were asked to predict the ultimate direc-
tion (either to the T or to the wide side of their service box; see
Figure 2 for an illustration of these two serve directions). As in
previous studies (Williams et al., 2004), serves that landed in the
middle of the service box were not considered, because of the
potential difficulty to classify objectively an observer’s response
to such serves. No feedback was provided to the participants dur-
ing the tIIT. The participants were not aware that the server was
performing this series of serves under the above two different con-
ditions (initially intended serves and non-initially intended serve).
Because, the ability to evaluate the body movements of another
FIGURE 1 | Experimental paradigm. Each trial first consisted of a
500ms-fixation cross, followed by a 5-s video clip, which froze on the last
frame of the video clip (when the player’s racquet struck the ball) for an
additional 2 s in order to provide participants with more response time, if
needed. In each video clip, the tennis player was shown bouncing the ball
twice, then winding up and striking the ball.
player and predict their intentions is facilitated by coupling previ-
ous experiences (both the sensorimotor cues that diagnose serve
location and the sensorimotor cues that do not) with any sensory
input (e.g., visual cues) that might cue them as to the intended
action (Kording andWolpert, 2004; Kilner and Frith, 2007; Kilner
et al., 2007), we assumed that, in the absence of reliable sensory
information due, for instance, to the high speed of a tennis serve,
expert tennis players would rely more on their previous bodily
visuo-motor experiences to determine the intended location of
the serve than visual information (Kording andWolpert, 2004). It
also follows that when an opponent completes most of the action
(e.g., a tennis serve) without any clear intention in mind, expert
tennis players should be near or at chance level when trying to
predict the direction of that action.
Interestingly, in the case of a tennis match, the same action
(e.g., a tennis serve) may reflect different intentions (e.g., to serve
to the T or the wide side of the service box). Given the impor-
tance of not being predictable on the tennis court, expert tennis
players are taught to perform the same perceptible actions regard-
less of their service intentions. Therefore, expert tennis players
not only have to rely on their past experiences of serving in ten-
nis to predict the intended location of their opponent’s serve
but they must eschew any masking behavioral cues that would
hide the intention of their opponent. The study of expert tennis
players while they try to predict accurately the ultimate inten-
tions (direction of a serve) of another player, thus, constitutes a
unique and ecologically valid opportunity to better understand
the mechanisms underlying the assumed visuo-motor matching
in embodied cognition.
FIGURE 2 | Experimental layout during creation of the stimuli. The
camera was located on a tripod on the baseline next to the service box of
the court diagonal from where the tennis player stood. The tennis player
could serve either to the center of the opposite side of the tennis court
(“T”) or to the wide side of the service box (“W”). This setting allowed the
participants to have a first person view while watching the video clips, as if
they were in a match situation standing on the tennis court ready to receive
the serve.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
All 25 fMRI participants were right-handed (Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory, Oldfield, 1971), and had normal or
corrected to-normal visual acuity with no history of psychiatric
or neurological disorder (as ascertained by a brief anamnesis and
self-report questionnaires, Davis, 1980; Zigmond and Snaith,
1983; Spielberger, 1987; Russell, 1996; Bellini et al., 2002; Lamm
et al., 2007). Mean age of participants was 26.2 years (SD = 8.95).
Because the goal of this study was to test the theory of shared
representation among experts, all participants were expert tennis
players (see questionnaire section below for further details).
PROCEDURE
Prior to participation, volunteers provided written informed con-
sent that had been approved by the Ethical Committee of the
University of Chicago, Illinois. The study took place over a single
visit. Upon arriving at the University of Chicago Brain Imaging
Center, participants completed a series of standard screening
forms. Then, they completed a series of tennis-related question-
naires, and a brief practice of the tennis intention inference task
(practice tIIT) outside the scanner, and an experimental tennis
intention inference task (experimental tIIT) while they were in
the 3T Philips fMRI scanner (see below for further details).
QUESTIONNAIRES
Participants’ tennis expertise was ascertained by their United
States Tennis Association (USTA) playing level, which was, on
average, 4.24 (SD = 0.93) out of a 7-point scale. A USTA level
of 4 denotes a player who has a dependable forehand and back-
hand, a variety of good shots (such as serves and lobs), and good
team work in doubles. To further understand the participants’
tennis profile, a series of exploratory questions about their ten-
nis habits/behaviors were also asked to the participants. These
additional questions investigated: (a) the number of hours our
participants played tennis per week; (b) the number of hours they
watched tennis on TV per week; (c) the age when the partici-
pants first begun playing tennis; and (d) the number of hours they
played tennis on video games per month.
PRACTICE TASK TENNIS INTENTION INFERENCE TASK (PRACTICE
TENNIS IIT)
In the practice tIIT, participants received detailed instructions
regarding the task, and viewed one sample video clip for which
they were asked to determine the intended location (either to the
center of the tennis court i.e., to the  T , or to the wide side
of the service box i.e., to the  W ) of the serve depicted in
that video clip. This example was meant to allow participants to
understand fully the instruction they would then perform in the
experimental tennis IIT (tIIT).
EXPERIMENTAL TENNIS INTENTION INFERENCE TASK
(EXPERIMENTAL t IIT)
As in the practice tIIT, in the experimental tIIT participants were
instructed to indicate as rapidly and as accurately as possible
where the tennis server intended to serve (either to the “T” or
to the “W” side of the service box).
Each trial began with a 500ms-fixation cross that was followed
immediately by a 5 s-target video clip (Figure 1). Because pre-
vious research has shown that expert athletes respond to visual
cues that occur well before a shot is struck (Ward et al., 2002),
all video clips in the tIIT (including video clip used in the prac-
tice tIIT) ceased as the expert tennis player’s racquet contacted
the ball, and remained frozen on this image for a maximum of 2 s
i.e., until the end of the duration of the response window, which
started when the video started. As during the brief practice and
as in previous IIT studies (Ortigue et al., 2009a,b, 2010a,b), par-
ticipants were allowed to respond at any point during the video
clip presentation, as well as during the 2 s immediately following
the completion of the video clip for a total response window of 7 s
(Figure 1).
STIMULI
Stimuli consisted of eight video clips [2 types of serves (IIS and
NIIS)× 2 starting positions (left and right)× 2 ball landing sides
(to the center “T” and to wide side “W” of the service box)] of an
unfamiliar right-handedmale expert tennis player (from Syracuse
University, Upstate New York) performing a tennis serve (one per
video). The video clips showed the tennis player on two different
starting positions [standing either on the right side from the par-
ticipant’s perspective of the tennis court (half of the video clips),
or on the left side of the tennis court] in order to control for any
participants’ lateralized attentional bias during the experimental
tIIT.
Across serve conditions, the server was able to perform the
same movements repeatedly, independently of the ultimate out-
come of his serves (either to the center or the wide side of the
service box) because of his high tennis level (USTA level: 7, which
denotes a world class player). He was also able to bounce the ball,
toss it and serve in the same way, using his regular action with a
relatively consistent velocity, independently of the intentionality
manipulation (see Supplementary Movies 1, 2 for examples).
APPARATUS
Videos of the server were taken with a digital Sony Cybershot
camera. The camera was located on a tripod on the baseline next
to the service box of the court diagonal from where the tennis
player stood (Figure 2). This setting allowed the participants to
have a first person view while watching the video clips, as if they
were in a match situation standing on the tennis court ready to
receive the serve. All video clips were presented using E-Prime
2.0 (Psychology Software Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, USA). During
the scanning session, participants viewed the stimuli on a back
projection screen mounted on the head coil of the MRI scanner.
VALIDATION OF THE STIMULI AND VIABILITY OF THE PARADIGM
In order to test the viability of our novel paradigm and test the
similarity of the server’s movements across serve conditions, we
performed three different steps. First, we performed a quanti-
tative analysis of all the tennis video clips using Dartfish i.e., a
performance video analysis software. Extensive research on antic-
ipatory skills in sport, in which the visual information available
to understand a tennis serve is cut off at some specific time
frames (temporal occlusion) during the serve, indicates that a
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key event for tennis is the ball/racket contact, with the move-
ment of the arm and the racket prior that key event being
the source of critical cues for racket sports (Tenenbaum et al.,
2000; Shim et al., 2006; Abernethy and Zawi, 2007; Jackson and
Mogan, 2007; Wright and Jackson, 2007; Williams et al., 2009
for review). Therefore, we analyzed the average speed of the
server’s movement up until he hit the ball. Results revealed that
this average speed did not significantly vary between the IIS
and NIIS conditions [MIIS = 1.94m/0.2 s, SD = 0.13; MNIIS =
2.03m/0.2 s, SD = 0.04; t(6) = −1.44; p = .20; two-tailed]. This
quantitative analysis revealed that the stimuli from both condi-
tions were visually comparable in terms of speed of the server’s
movements.
Second, we performed a visual qualitative analysis of the video
clips by asking three persons (SC, JTC, BM) who are knowledge-
able (although non expert) in tennis to view all the video clips,
one by one, and tried to determine whether any obvious visual
differences appeared between the two serve conditions i.e., IIS
and NIIS. Although these three persons were aware of the two
different experimental conditions, none of them was able to iden-
tify any visual differences between video clips. This result was
reinforced with the behavioral performance from 29 other indi-
viduals [18 men, 11 women; mean age of 31.55 (SD = 10.32)] we
recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). To ensure the
respondents were real participants, rather than a computerized
script, a compliance check question was included that instructed
respondents to answer “left” to validate that they were reading the
survey prior to responding. Although 50 individuals were initially
involved, 42% of the respondents failed to answer this compliance
check correctly, so their data were not included in the analysis.
Thus, the final sample was composed of 29 individuals.
All 29 participants were non-expert tennis players (as ascer-
tained by their self-report USTA tennis levels: M = 2.73, SD =
1.29) and were not aware of the two serve conditions. Each
participant viewed all video clips in one of two specific random-
ized orders. Results revealed no significant gender difference [for
men: MIIS = 51.4%, SD = 18.1; MNIIS = 52.8%, SD = 28.3; for
women: MIIS = 56.8%, SD = 22.6; MNIIS serves = 52.3%, SD =
28.4; t(27) = −0.367, n.s., r = −0.073], and no significant effect
of the serve conditions on accuracy [t(28) = 0.138, n.s., r =
0.018], with participants being at chance level for both types of
serves (MIIS = 53.5%, SD = 19.7; MNIIS = 52.6%, SD = 27.8).
No reaction times were recorded in the MTURK study.
Then, to make sure that this novel task was suitable for ten-
nis experts, we asked a pro-tennis player (FF), who is also an
active pro-tennis coach on the ATP tour, to watch the video clips
and perform a qualitative analysis. Although he was not aware
of the two conditions, he was able to detect nuances at the level
of the hips of the server that differed between the two condi-
tions. Interestingly, he was not able to name or identify the two
conditions after identifying two different types of stimuli. All he
could report was that some tennis serves (the IIS, according to
SC’s observation of FF’s performance) were easier to anticipate
than others in the set of video clips. This procedure suggests that
a pro-tennis player could not report the specific content (IIS and
NIIS) of the video clips, and that we, thus, could use these video
clips in our study with tennis experts.
EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM
The present tIIT included 5 blocks. Each block was com-
posed of 8 trials. In order to increase the number of stim-
ulus presentations, the participants were asked to perform
the experimental tIIT twice: once in the hypothetical con-
text of a friendly match with a tennis practice partner; and
once in the hypothetical context of a competitive match with
that same tennis practice partner. This procedure led to a
total of 10 blocks. Block order was selected at random by
E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, USA),
with the condition that both match types must be presented
exactly five times. Accordingly the order of presentation of
the 10 blocks differed across participants. All the eight videos
were presented once in each of the 10 blocks. The presen-
tation of each video was completely randomized within each
of block. In sum, a total 80 trials were presented to each
participant.
DEPENDENT MEASURES
Response accuracy (in percent, %), reaction times from the
onset of the video (in milliseconds, ms), and brain activity were
recorded while participants made a decision as to ultimate direc-
tion of the serves. In addition, to account for a potential intention
advantage, we calculated a conventional accuracy index score
(Marshall et al., 1975) for percentage correct responses between
Initially Intended Serve (IIS) with Non-Initially Intended Serve
(NIIS) condition as follows: (IIS − NIIS)/(IIS + NIIS). Thus,
positive values indicate an IIS advantage and negative values
a NIIS advantage. Finally, to eliminate any potential response
bias in our accuracy measure, we also calculated a d′ accuracy
index (Dprime.AccuracyIndex), using Marshall et al.’s accuracy
Index formula as follows: (IIS − NIIS)/(IIS + NIIS). In this d′
accuracy index, we converted percent correct scores to d′ for
IIS and NIIS items using the formula z(Hit) − z(False Alarm),
which gave us Dprime.IIS and Dprime.NIIS. Converted Dprime
values.
BEHAVIORAL STATISTICAL ANALYSES
In line with our hypotheses, we collapsed across match hypo-
thetical contexts (friendly or competitive), starting position
(left or right) and ball landing sides (“T” or “W”), yielding
a repeated-measures design with serve type (IIS vs. NIIS) as
a within-subjects factor. Mean reaction times and percentage
were calculated for each subject and condition. Outliers were
removed by eliminating responses greater than 3.5 standard devi-
ations from the grand mean. Using this cutoff resulted in the
removal of 4.5% of all trials (across participants). Repeated mea-
sures ANOVAs were utilized to analyze potential differences in
reaction times and accuracy between serve types in the tIIT.
Additionally, correlational analyses were performed to examine
the relationship between self-reported data about tennis (USTA
level, hours playing tennis per week, hours watching tennis on
TV per week, and age first learned tennis) and our behav-
ioral dependent measures (See Table 1 for accuracy and reaction
times; and see Table S1 for accuracy index and d′ accuracy
index).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 781 | 5
Cacioppo et al. Neuroimaging of predicting tennis returns
Table 1 | Pearson correlations (df = 23) between various
tennis-related self-reported measures and behavioral measures.
RTall RTIIS RTNIIS ACCall ACCIIS ACCNIIS
USTA level 0.24 0.30 0.22 −0.09 0.12 −0.23
Hours playing
tennis/week
−0.15 −0.13 −0.18 0.44* 0.43* 0.24
Hours
watching
tennis/week
0.17 0.19 0.15 0.17 −0.05 0.05
Age first
learned tennis
−0.03 −0.06 −0.004 −0.31 −0.26 −0.23
*Denotes p < 0.05.
NEUROIMAGING RECORDINGS AND PROCESSING
Magnetic resonance imaging recordings
Imaging was performed on a 3-T Philips Achieva Quasar Dual 16
Ch scanner with quadrature head coil used for spin excitation and
signal reception. High-resolution volumetric T1-weighted spoiled
gradient-recalled (SPGR) images were obtained for each partici-
pant in one hundred sixty-one 1.0-mm sagittal slices with 8◦ flip
angle and 24 cm field of view (FOV) for use as anatomical images.
Functional images using a block design and were acquired using a
echo-planar acquisition with Z-Shimming with 32 × 4-mm coro-
nal slices with an inter-slice gap of 0.5mm spanning the whole
brain (TR = 2.5 s, TE = 30ms, flip angle = 80◦, FOV = 22 cm,
64 × 64 matrix size, fat suppressed).
Functional image processing and analyses
Image pre-processing and analyses were performed using Analysis
of Functional NeuroImages software (AFNI, Medical College of
Wisconsin). For each participant, motion detection and correc-
tion were undertaken using a six-parameter, rigid-body trans-
formation. Functional images were co-registered and spatially
smoothed using a 5-mm full width at half maximumGaussian fil-
ter. Individual-subject analyses were conducted using the general
linear model to generate estimates of blood oxygenation level-
dependent (BOLD) signal on a voxelwise basis (Ward, 2002).
Stimulus timing vectors for each of the experimental conditions
were modeled for 3 TRs after each stimulus onset, and each vector
was convolved with a gamma-variate waveform using the AFNI
program Waver. The resulting model was fit voxelwise to prepro-
cessed time-series data with a linear least-squares model using
the AFNI program 3dDeconvolve, generating a map consisting
of beta coefficients (fit values) at each voxel for each mod-
eled condition—intended serve/non intended serve;—as well as
a baseline coefficient. Two GLMs were assessed for each sub-
jects: one modeling only correctly identified T/W trials, and one
modeling only incorrectly identified T/W trials. Output from the
deconvolution analysis for each subject was scaled voxelwise to
percent signal change from baseline, and each subject’s data were
spatially transformed to the MNI Colin27 Atlas (1998) stereo-
taxic coordinate space and interpolated to 3mm3 isometric voxels
for group analysis (Holmes et al., 1998). Voxelwise fMRI anal-
yses were performed at the group level, the results of which
were corrected for multiple comparisons by using a Monte Carlo
simulation to determine minimum cluster sizes corresponding to
an alpha value of 0.05 for voxelwise thresholds of p < .01 and
p < .025 (Nichols, 2012). Groupwise analyses were carried out for
correct-item and incorrect-item models. A voxelwise [IIS/NIIS]
ANOVA was performed, as well as whole-brain voxelwise Pearson
correlation to identify regions in which differential BOLD activity
in response to the stimulus effect (i.e., IIS-NIIS) was associ-
ated with behavioral responses related to tennis i.e., USTA level,
hours playing tennis per week, hours watching tennis on TV per
week, and age first learned tennis. In addition, we used the reac-
tion times and intention accuracy index scores (Tables 4, 5) in
correlational analyses with the BOLD signal contrasting IIS and
NIIS (Voxelwise correlation of BOLD [IIS - NIIS] for correct
trials × Dprime.AccuracyIndex, cluster were also calculate with
a threshold at voxelwise p < .01 corrected to alpha < 0.05. See
Table S2).
RESULTS
QUESTIONNAIRES
On average, participants reported: (a) having a USTA level of 4.24
(SD = 0.93) out of a 7-point scale; (b) playing tennis 3.56 (SD =
3.98) hours per week, (c) watching tennis on TV 1.92 (SD = 4.31)
hours per week, and (d) having begun playing tennis at the age
of 9.36 (SD = 5.26). Most of the participants also reported not
playing tennis on video games (three of the participants reported
playing video-tennis game less than 2 hours per month).
Behavioral tIIT results
As predicted, the behavioral results showed that the observers
were better at predicting initially intended serves, IIS (64.16%
correct, SD = 0.099) than non-initially intended serves, NIIS
[52.40% correct, SD = 0.099; F(1, 24) = 25.387; p < .001; d =
1.18]. When percent correct values were converted to d′, Z(H) −
Z(FA), results showed a similar significant effect of IIS/NIIS
on accuracy [t(24) = 4.736, p = 8.126e-05; 95% CI (0.34; 0.87);
mean of d′ differences = 0.61]. Note that this behavioral result
is also statistically significant on the same order of magni-
tude (p < .0001), when using percent correct in lieu of d′. No
differences in reaction times were observed between the two
serve conditions for correct responses [MIIS = 5609.64ms, SD =
387.58; MNIIS = 5637.26ms, SD = 425.12; F(1, 24) = 2.62; p =
.12; d = −0.07). A post-hoc paired t-test conducted to see if
reaction times were different between IIS and NIIS for incorrect
responses revealed no differences in reaction times between the
two serve conditions [MIIS. incorrect = 5622.75ms, SD = 418.99;
MNIIS. incorrect = 5636.25ms, SD = 438.77; t(24) = −0.61; p =
.55; d = −0.031]. To check whether the participants were able
to identify the different conditions during the task, an experi-
menter (AB) performed a debriefing with each participant after
the experimental tIIT. None of the participants reported being
aware of the two serve conditions.
Behavioral correlational analyses
Significant positive correlations were observed between the num-
ber of hours the participants reported playing tennis per week
and three behavioral measures: (i) the overall accuracy; (ii) the
accuracy for IIS; and the d′ accuracy index. Together these results
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suggest that the more participants reported playing tennis per
week, the better they were at predicting accurately the tennis
serve of the model, especially when this latter knew in advance
where he intended to serve. No other significant correlations were
found between the different tennis-related questionnaires and the
accuracy or reaction times (See Table 1 and Table S1 for details).
NEUROIMAGING RESULTS
IIS-NIIS contrast
In line with our behavioral results, our neuroimaging results
showed regional changes in hemodynamic activity for correct
behavioral predictions of initially intended (IIS) serves (com-
pared to non-initially intended, NIIS, serves) in four main cor-
tical areas: right occipital cortex, right superior parietal lobule
(SPL), left extrastriate body area (EBA), and left inferior pari-
etal lobule (IPL, extending to the left temporo-parietal junc-
tion, TPJ; Figure 3). In addition, increased brain activity was
also detected in dopaminergic-rich sub-cortical regions (e.g.,
bilateral thalamus, right putamen, and right caudate nucleus;
Table 2) known to be involved in somatosensory integration,
motivation, goal-directed actions as well as formation habits and
procedural memory (Ashby and Crossley, 2010, 2012). On the
other hand, the brain activity associated with correct behav-
ioral predictions of non-initially intended serves (compared to
initially intended serves) revealed only one specific hemody-
namic increase in the left calcarine gyrus, extending to the
left cuneus—a brain region associated with visual information
processing.
FIGURE 3 | Neuroimaging results representing the comparison between
the IIS and NIIS contrasts for correct trials. Results are projected onto the
Caret AFNI Colin Brain surface model. Voxelwise threshold at p < .01, multiple
comparison correction to minimum cluster vol of 702 ul (26 voxels). Results
from the IIS - NIIS contrast are represented in orange/red. Results from the
NIIS - IIS contrast are represented in blue.
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Table 2 | BOLD responses obtained for IIS > NIIS for correct trials.
Vol (ul) x y z t
27.8% overlap with Right Calcarine Gyrus (BA18)
24.5% overlap with Right Lingual Gyrus
12.9% overlap with Right Cuneus
11.1% overlap with Right Superior Occipital Gyrus
10.9% overlap with Right Middle Occipital Gyrus
5.3% overlap with Right Fusiform Gyrus
15,579 18.2 −76.6 4.1 3.9245
32.2% overlap with Right Superior Parietal Lobule (BA7)
23.9% overlap with Precuneus
14.9% overlap with Superior Parietal Lobule
12.1% overlap with Precuneus
5832 2.8 −66.8 54.3 3.1006
31.7% overlap with Right Thalamus
11.7% overlap with Right Superior Temporal Gyrus
7.7% overlap with Right Insula Lobe
6.2% overlap with Right Putamen
3105 27.7 −21.5 3 3.2895
56.5% overlap with Left Thalamus
10.9% overlap with Left Hippocampus
2646 −16.5 −23.5 7.9 3.325
78.1% overlap with Left Inferior Temporal Gyrus (BA37)
18.2% overlap with Left Middle Occipital Gyrus
2538 −45.1 −63.9 2.4 3.2919
66.5% overlap with Left Inferior Parietal Lobule (BA40)
31.4% overlap with Left SupraMarginal Gyrus
1512 −50.1 −42.7 35 3.2227
58.8% overlap with Right Putamen
23.5% overlap with Right Caudate Nucleus
1107 23.2 12.9 9.5 3.1579
81.4% overlap with Left Middle Occipital Gyrus (BA18)
18.6% overlap with Left Inferior Occipital Gyrus
999 −31.7 −82.3 −4.5 3.1296
94.5% overlap with Left Middle Occipital Gyrus (BA19) 891 −34.5 −83.1 20.9 3.1188
56.4% overlap with Right Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA47) 756 25.8 32.3 −6.3 3.1743
The overlap is the percentage of voxels relative to the entire size of the cluster that overlapped with a given region’s spatial map in the AFNI MNI atlas. So, for
example, “32.2% overlap in Right Superior Parietal Lobule” means 32.2% of the cluster’s entire volume was spatially located in the MNI region outlining the Right
Superior Parietal Lobule.
To further determine whether the above brain areas were spe-
cific to correct trials of the tIIT, we also performed an analysis
of the brain activity of the participants’ incorrect trials. As for
the analyses of correct trials, the neuroimaging analyses of the
regional changes in brain activity for incorrect behavioral predic-
tions of IIS (compared to NIIS) revealed hemodynamic activation
in brain areas involved in basic analysis of visual information and
biological motion (right occipital cortex), attention (right SPL),
and simulation and action observation (e.g., left inferior frontal
gyrus, inferior parietal lobule; Table 3; Figure 4).
Similar to the correct trials, the brain activity associated with
incorrect behavioral predictions of non-initially intended serves
(compared to initially intended serves) revealed only one specific
hemodynamic increase in the left cuneus extending to the left cal-
carine gyrus—a brain region associated with visual information
processing. Different from the neuroimaging results for the cor-
rect trials, incorrect trials were also characterized by brain activity
in right TPJ (right superior temporal gyrus) and left precentral
gyrus/inferior frontal, and right IPL, but not in the right inferior
frontal gyrus nor left IPL (Table 3; Figure 4). Indeed, compared
to correct trials, incorrect trials were characterized by the absence
of activations between IIS and NIIS in: (i) the caudate or thala-
mus, (ii) the right inferior frontal gyrus (an area known to be
important in intention understanding; Iacoboni et al., 2005), (iii)
left IPL, and (iv) EBA area.
fMRI correlational analyses
For correct trials, a positive correlation was observed between
the accuracy index and BOLD IIS-NIIS contrast signal in
dopaminergic-rich brain areas involved in procedural memory
(such as the caudate nucleus; Figure 5), in the cerebellum and the
left middle/superior temporal gyrus (Table 4), two areas known
to be involved in analyses of motor movements and social cog-
nition (Van Overwalle et al., 2014). Interestingly, correlations
between d′ accuracy index and BOLD IIS-NIIS contrast revealed
a different pattern of regional brain activations (Table S2). This
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Table 3 | BOLD responses obtained for IIS > NIIS for incorrect trials.
Vol (ul) x y z t
40.9% overlap with Right Lingual Gyrus (BA18)
40.9% overlap with Right Calcarine Gyrus
9.1% overlap with Right Cuneus
10,692 12 −72 0 4.26
28.1% overlap with Left Rolandic Operculum (BA41)
12.5% overlap with Left Superior Temporal Gyrus
1647 −38 −31 17 3.22
25.2% overlap with Left Precentral gyrus (BA44)
20.5% overlap with Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Opercularis)
14.4% overlap with Left Temporal Pole
14.0% overlap with Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Triangularis)
1593 −44 13 7 3.12
49.3% overlap with Right Rolandic Operculum (BA42)
42.3% overlap with Right Superior Temporal Gyrus
1080 59 −14 12 3.12
60.1% overlap with Right Inferior Parietal Lobule (BA40)
24.6% overlap with Right Superior Temporal Gyrus
702 62 −31 25 3.09
58.2% overlap with Right Superior Parietal Lobule (BA 7)
37.4% overlap with Right Precuneus
702 15 −73 56 3.22
The overlap is the percentage of voxels relative to the entire size of the cluster that overlapped with a given region’s spatial map in the AFNI MNI atlas. So, for
example, “40.9% overlap in Right Lingual Gyrus” means 40.9% of the cluster’s entire volume was spatially located in the MNI region outlining the Right Lingual
Gyrus.
FIGURE 4 | Neuroimaging results representing the comparison between
the IIS and NIIS contrast effects. A surface projection on the Caret AFNI
Colin Brain surface model depicting the two-tailed result of the main effects
for IIS - NIIS for both correct and incorrect trials (p < 0.01, corrected). Color
codes indicate cluster effects for correctly identified trials (yellow: IIS > NIIS,
green: NIIS > IIS) and incorrectly identified trials (red: IIS > NIIS, blue: NIIS >
IIS). Overlaps between these results are indicated with a combination of
colors: orange regions indicate where correct and incorrect responses
overlapped for IIS > NIIS contrasts in the right cuneus, while cyan indicates
overlap of correct and incorrect NIIS > IIS effects in the left cuneus. No
regions showed overlap between different directions of effects (i.e., IIS >
NIIS and NIIS > IIS or vice-versa).
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FIGURE 5 | Correlation between BOLD activity and behavioral accuracy index in the left caudate nucleus. The correlation between the contrast of BOLD
[IIS - NIIS] × accuracy index score (r = 0.56, p < .01, corrected) is projected onto the Caret AFNI Colin Brain surface model.
Table 4 | Correlations between BOLD [IIS – NIIS] for correct trials and behavioral measures.
BOLD [IIS – NIIS] for correct trials × Accuracy index Vol (ul) x y z r
15.1% overlap with Cerebellum 3105 0 −30 −21 0.57
8.8% overlap with Cerebellar Vermis
8.4% overlap with Cerebellar Vermis
57.7% overlap with Left Middle Temporal Gyrus (BA21) 2268 −47 −30 −2 0.57
9.5% overlap with Left Superior Temporal Gyrus
30.5% overlap with Left Caudate Nucleus 1944 −8 17 16 0.56
19.9% overlap with Right Caudate Nucleus 918 19 −19 27 0.56
BOLD [IIS – NIIS] for correct trials × Reaction times Vol (ul) x y z r
NO CLUSTERS FOUND
The overlap is the percentage of voxels relative to the entire size of the cluster that overlapped with a given region’s spatial map in the AFNI MNI atlas. So, for
example, “15.1% overlap in Cerebellum” means 15.1% of the cluster’s entire volume was spatially located in the MNI region outlining the Cerebellum.
is in line with d′ and simple accuracy measures reflecting dif-
ferent psychological mechanisms. More precisely, the accuracy
index reflects correct trials whether by stimulus discriminability
or response biases, whereas d′ accuracy reflects stimulus discrim-
inability per se. Although both indices were significant for the
superior temporal gyrus, correlational results for the d′ accuracy
index selectively revealed greater activation in brain areas involved
in attention, intention understanding (e.g., inferior frontal
gyrus), perceptual discrimination (e.g., hypothalamus), and asso-
ciative memory and perception of places and visual paths (e.g.,
parahippocampal region; Rajimehr et al., 2011; Table S2). Finally,
no significant correlation was observed between the reaction
times and BOLD IIS-NIIS contrast for correct trials (Table 4).
For incorrect trials, no significant correlations were observed
between the accuracy index and BOLD IIS-NIIS contrast
(Table 5), whereas a negative correlation was found in the
left angular gyrus for the d′ accuracy index (Table S3). This
result suggests that the more participants made incorrect
discriminations between the two conditions, the less this part
of the brain was activated. The present results suggest that a
reduced activity of this brain area, which is known to sustain vari-
ous functions, such as self-other expansion, embodied cognition,
and mental representation of past self-experiences, may play an
important role in the commission of errors in tennis serve pre-
dictions. Finally, significant correlations were found for reaction
times (Table 5). These correlations were a positive correlation in
the right superior frontal gyrus and a negative correlation in the
right parahippocampal gyrus (Table 5).
USTA levels. A positive correlation was observed between USTA
levels and BOLD activity for correct trials in the calcarine
gyrus, extending to the lingual gyrus, left post-central gyrus, left
thalamus, left caudate nucleus, right superior temporal gyrus,
bilateral hippocampus, right para-hippocampal region, bilateral
precuneus, left IFG, bilateral IPL, right angular gyrus, anterior
cingulate and SMA (Table 6). Although no correlation was found
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Table 5 | Correlations between BOLD [IIS – NIIS] for incorrect trials and behavioral measures.
BOLD [IIS – NIIS] for incorrect trials × Accuracy index Vol (ul) x y z r
NO CLUSTERS FOUND
BOLD [IIS – NIIS] incorrect trials × Reaction times Vol (ul) x y z r
52.2% overlap with Right Superior Frontal Gyrus (BA8) 1809 4 34 44 0.56
51.0% overlap with Right Parahippocampal Gyrus (BA 30) 1026 30 −58 6 −0.57
The overlap is the percentage of voxels relative to the entire size of the cluster that overlapped with a given region’s spatial map in the AFNI MNI atlas. So, for
example, “52.2% overlap in Right Superior Frontal Gyrus” means 52.2% of the cluster’s entire volume was spatially located in the MNI region outlining the Right
Superior Frontal Gyrus.
between behavioral results and USTA levels, these findings are
interesting as they suggest that the higher the USTA level of the
participants was, the more intense was the activity in these brain
regions involved in goal-directed motor actions, embodied cog-
nition, attention, intention understanding, self-other expansion,
and associative and procedural memory. No significant clusters
were found between the USTA levels of the participants and their
brain activity recruited during the difference scores of incorrect
trials between IIS and NIIS (Table 7).
Number of hours playing tennis per week. A negative correlation
was observed between this measure and the activity in a brain
area involved in risk taking and decision making and simulation
(insula; Paulus et al., 2003) for the difference scores of correct
trials between IIS and NIIS (Table 6). These findings are prelimi-
nary but may suggest that the more participants reported playing
tennis per week, the less the activity in these two brain areas
when making correct tennis serve predictions—an interpretation
that is consistent with the behavioral correlations we reported
above.
For the difference scores of incorrect trials between IIS and
NIIS, a negative correlation (r = −0.59, p < .05) was observed
in the right superior temporal gyrus (BA 41; Table 7), suggest-
ing that the more participants reported playing tennis per week,
the less the activity in this particular brain areas when making
incorrect tennis serve predictions.
Number of hours watching tennis on TV per week. No signif-
icant clusters were found between the number of hours partic-
ipants reported watching tennis on TV and their brain activity
recruited during the difference scores of correct trials between
IIS and NIIS (Table 6). For incorrect predictions, however, a sig-
nificant negative correlation was observed between this measure
and the activity in their right angular gyrus (Table 7), which
suggests that the more participants reported watching tennis
on TV, the less their right angular gyrus was activated during
their incorrect predictions. These results are consistent our above
results suggesting a potential important role of the de-activation
(or reduced activity) of the angular gyrus in incorrect tennis
serve predictions. Finally, other negative correlations between
the reported number of hours watching tennis on TV per week
and activity in brain areas involved in motion, intention under-
standing, attention, and goal-directed actions (See Table 7 for
details).
Age of the participants when they first begun playing tennis. For
correct trials, a negative correlation was observed between this
tennis-related measure and brain activity in the right pallidum,
right caudate nucleus, and bilateral insula, whereas a positive
correlation was observed between this measure and the activ-
ity in the right medial frontal gyrus, and brain areas involved
in self-other representation, simulation and embodied cognition
(see Table 6 for details). For incorrect trials, negative correlations
were observed in the right insula, and bilateral superior temporal
gyrus, although positive correlations were observed in the right
angular gyrus, the right hippocampus, right supramarginal gyrus,
and the right cerebellum (Table 7).
DISCUSSION
Anticipating intentions of an opponent during a fast interaction
is a challenging problem. Our results reinforce and expand prior
research by demonstrating that tennis experts are better at pre-
dicting where an expert server intends to serve (T or wide) when
that expert server knows where he intends to serve before than
after he tosses the ball in the air. Because the same action (a
serve) can reflect different intentions (e.g., to serve to the T or
the wide side of the service box) in tennis, the present study high-
lights the power of cognitive thinking prior action in interpersonal
intention understanding. Although the participants were not able
to explicitly articulate the reason of their successful tennis serve
predictions, they were better at predicting IIS than NIIS.
These findings support predictions by the simulation and
embodied cognition theories by demonstrating that the observers
are more efficient in predicting one’s intentions when that some-
one is pre-cognizant of their intentions before initiating their
action (IIS condition) than when they don’t know in advance
their action intention (NIIS condition). In other words, when
the observers share a common mental representation of action
with the server, observers can more accurately read the inten-
tions of the server. As demonstrated in previous research, this
facilitation effect in reading another’s intentions is positively cor-
related with active practice (as measured with the number of
hours playing tennis per week) rather than passive practice (as
measured with the number of hours watching tennis per week).
Further studies could be done to specifically test the effects of the
different components of a tennis profile and habits of a player
on their anticipatory behaviors and performance. For instance,
based on simulation and embodied cognition theories, one may
be interested in comparing the effect of active tennis practice (e.g.,
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Table 6 | Correlations between tennis-related, self-reported measures, and BOLD [IIS – NIIS] contrast for correct trials.
BOLD [IIS – NIIS] x USTA level Vol (ul) x y z r
10.4% overlap with Left Calcarine Gyrus 47,466 −4 −46 −1 0.58
8.0% overlap with Left Lingual Gyrus
6.4% overlap with Right Lingual Gyrus
5.2% overlap with Left Calcarine Gyrus
3.9% overlap with Left Fusiform Gyrus
3.9% overlap with Left Middle Occipital Gyrus
3.8% overlap with Left Hippocampus
21.5% overlap with Left Postcentral Gyrus 9558 −25 −17 28 0.56
9.4% overlap with Left SupraMarginal Gyrus,
5.6% overlap with Left Thalamus,
5.4% overlap with Left Caudate Nucleus
4.6% overlap with Left Middle Frontal Gyrus
3.3% overlap with Left Inferior Parietal Lobule
34.9% overlap with Right Superior Temporal Gyrus 6264 37 −22 −3 0.56
17.9% overlap with Right Hippocampus
10.6% overlap with Right ParaHippocampal Gyrus
6.8% overlap with Right Middle Temporal Gyrus
5.4% overlap with Right Fusiform Gyrus
3.3% overlap with Right Insula Lobe
17.1% overlap with Right Parietal Lobe/Precuneus (BA 7) 3240 27 −65 29 0.56
16.3% overlap with Right Angular Gyrus
14.7% overlap with Right Superior Occipital Gyrus
14.6% overlap with Right Precuneus
13.7% overlap with Right Cuneus
3.8% overlap with Right Middle Temporal Gyrus
3.4% overlap with Right Superior Parietal Lobule
44.2% overlap with Right Postcentral Gyrus (BA3) 2619 43 −20 41 0.55
34.6% overlap with Right Precentral Gyrus
3.5% overlap with Right Inferior Parietal Lobule
33.8% overlap with Right Middle Cingulate Gyrus (BA 24) 1917 6 0 46 0.54
31.9% overlap with Right SMA
13.7% overlap with Right SMA
9.0% overlap with Middle Cingulate Cortex
4.4% overlap with Right Superior Frontal Gyrus
83.9% overlap with Left Parietal Lobule/Precuneus (BA 7) 1566 −22 −61 52 0.54
11.0% overlap with Left Inferior Parietal Lobule
4.1% overlap with Left Precuneus
24.2% overlap with Left Anterior Cingulate Cortex (BA32) 999 −23 33 12 0.57
3.6% overlap with Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus
80.8% overlap with Right Precentral Gyrus (BA4) 918 58 −9 22 0.55
15.0% overlap with Right Rolandic Operculum
BOLD [IIS – NIIS] × Hours playing tennis per week Vol (ul) x y z r
65.2% overlap with Left Insula Lobe (BA 13) 729 −35 21 12 −0.57
33.5% overlap with Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus
BOLD [IIS – NIIS] × Hours watching tennis per week Vol (ul) x y z r
NO CLUSTERS FOUND
(Continued)
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Table 6 | Continued
BOLD [IIS – NIIS] × Age first learned tennis Vol (ul) x y z r
21.6% overlap with Right Pallidum 2916 15 −1 −3 –0.59
14.5% overlap with Right Caudate Nucleus
5.8% overlap with Right Thalamus
4.6% overlap with Right Hippocampus
4.0% overlap with Right Amygdala
51.8% overlap with Right Medial Frontal Gyrus (BA 9) 2268 4 41 19 0.60
38.7% overlap with Anterior Cingulate Cortex
32.7% overlap with Right Insula (BA 13) 1458 38 8 −11 −0.60
12.0% overlap with Right Temporal Pole
6.5% overlap with Right Middle Temporal Gyrus
5.3% overlap with Right Superior Temporal Gyrus
52.4% overlap with Left Insula (BA 13) 1404 −41 3 −11 −0.62
29.0% overlap with Left Superior Temporal Gyrus
4.1% overlap with Left Middle Temporal Gyrus
94.9% overlap with Left Middle Temporal Gyrus (BA 39) 1350 −53 −56 9 0.61
5.1% overlap with Left Superior Temporal Gyrus
50.9% overlap with Right Anterior Prefrontal Cortex (BA10) 1134 28 49 21 0.59
39.7% overlap with Right Middle Frontal Gyrus
51.2% overlap with Right Cerebellum 891 16 −52 −43 0.65
99.7% overlap with Right Cerebellum 891 32 −61 −30 0.58
68.0% overlap with Right Superior Temporal Gyrus (BA 22) 891 50 −18 8 0.60
28.5% overlap with Right Heschls Gyrus
3.0% overlap with Right Rolandic Operculum
100% overlap with Right Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA 9) 891 52 15 21 0.56
96.7% overlap with Right Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA 13) 783 43 29 4 0.56
67.0% overlap with Left Angular Gyrus (BA 39) 729 −38 −57 33 0.56
32.3% overlap with Left Inferior Parietal Lobule
The overlap is the percentage of voxels relative to the entire size of the cluster that overlapped with a given region’s spatial map in the AFNI MNI atlas. So, for
example, “67.0% overlap in Left Angular Gyrus” means 67.0% of the cluster’s entire volume was spatially located in the MNI region outlining the Left Angular Gyrus.
playing tennis every week) vs. passive tennis practice (e.g., observ-
ing tennis on TV every week) on the accuracy and speed of serve
predictions.
Our neuroimaging results extend these behavioral findings by
demonstrating that accurate predictions were characterized by
activation within both the Action Observation Network (AON
including the hMNS) and the social brain network (SN). More
precisely, our fMRI analyses of the IIS—NISS contrast for correct
trials revealed activation of brain areas known to be involved in a
broad variety of functions, including: (a) action prediction tasks
(EBA in basketball athletes; Abreu et al., 2012), perception of body
parts (Downing et al., 2001), limb movements, motor imagery
and performance of motor action (Astafiev et al., 2004); (b) basic
analysis of visual information and biological motion (calcarine
gyrus, lingual gyrus; Servos et al., 2002); (c) attention and target
discrimination (e.g., SPL; Capotosto et al., 2013); (d) retrieval
of sensorimotor information and episodic memory (e.g., inferior
parietal lobule; Sestieri et al., 2013); (e) action perspective from
an egocentric viewpoint and intention understanding; (f) embod-
ied cognition and simulation (e.g., inferior frontal gyrus, inferior
parietal lobule; Grafton, 2009; Ortigue et al., 2009a, 2010a; Juan
et al., 2013; Mazzarella et al., 2013); and (g) analysis of biological
motion, agency, body parts, and perspective taking (STS and infe-
rior parietal lobule; Buchel et al., 1998; Grezes et al., 2001; Ruby
and Decety, 2001, 2003, 2004; Grossman and Blake, 2002; Ruby
et al., 2002; Astafiev et al., 2004; Wright and Jackson, 2007). By
demonstrating such a specific involvement of the inferior fronto-
parietal network for correct trials (no similar constellation of
brain activation was observed for incorrect trials; see Table 2),
our present results reinforce Wright and Jackson (2007)’s results
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Table 7 | Correlations between tennis-related, self-reported measures, and BOLD [IIS – NIIS] contrast for incorrect trials.
BOLD [IIS – NIIS] × USTA level Vol (ul) x y z r
NO CLUSTERS FOUND
BOLD [IIS – NIIS] × Hours playing tennis per week Vol (ul) x y z r
41.0% overlap with Right Superior Temporal Gyrus (BA41) 1161 42 −38 9 −0.59
BOLD [IIS – NIIS] × Hours Watching Tennis per Week Vol (ul) x y z r
49.6% overlap with Right Angular Gyrus (BA 39) 5184 41 −60 22 −0.57
19.7% overlap with Right Middle Temporal Gyrus
7.1% overlap with Right Middle Occipital Gyrus
38.0% overlap with Left Cerebellum 3672 −25 −60 −33 −0.55
22.8% overlap with Left Cerebellum
12.7% overlap with Left Fusiform Gyrus
64.1% overlap with Left Precuneus (BA 7) 2889 −6 −69 41 −0.56
20.9% overlap with Left Superior Parietal Lobule
13.0% overlap with Right Precuneus
91.7% overlap with Right Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA 9) 2349 32 35 37 −0.59
7.2% overlap with Right Superior Frontal Gyrus
30.5% overlap with Left Posterior Cingulate Cortex (BA 29) 2052 −3 −49 6 −0.63
16.7% overlap with Cerebellar Vermis
10.7% overlap with Left Calcarine Gyrus
82.0% overlap with Right Superior Parietal Lobule (BA 7) 1890 33 −55 57 −0.58
9.3% overlap with Right Postcentral Gyrus
28.0% overlap with Left Middle Cingulate Gyrus (BA 23) 1647 0 −27 30 −0.55
7.7% overlap with Right Middle Cingulate Gyrus
42.6% overlap with Right Caudate Nucleus 999 16 −10 24 −0.59
13.0% overlap with Right Thalamus
61.4% overlap with Right Cerebellum 945 22 −54 −21 −0.55
23.9% overlap with Right Fusiform Gyrus
14.5% overlap with Right Cerebellum
32.4% overlap with Left Parahippocampal Area (BA 34) 945 −24 1 −9 −0.6
11.3% overlap with Left Putamen
3.8% overlap with Right Postcentral Gyrus (BA 2) 864 31 −23 37 −0.55
1.5% overlap with Right SupraMarginal Gyrus
88.4% overlap with Left Superior Temporal Gyrus (BA 13) 810 −54 −40 19 −0.6
11.6% overlap with Left SupraMarginal Gyrus
BOLD [IIS – NIIS] × Age first learned tennis Vol (ul) x y z r
21.4% overlap with Right Insula 1809 22 6 −10 −0.63
13.7% overlap with Right Amygdala
5.4% overlap with Right Putamen
54.1% overlap with Right Angular Gyrus (BA 39) 1809 42 −70 29 0.56
31.0% overlap with Right Middle Occipital Gyrus
7.2% overlap with Right Middle Temporal Gyrus
(Continued)
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Table 7 | Continued
BOLD [IIS – NIIS] × Age first learned tennis Vol (ul) x y z r
67.8% overlap with Right Cerebellum 1107 17 −52 −46 0.63
47.5% overlap with Right Middle Temporal Gyrus (BA 21) 1026 45 −2 −15 0.62
17.0% overlap with Right Superior Temporal Gyrus
51.4% overlap with Right Hippocampus 1026 24 −16 −15 0.57
37.5% overlap with Right ParaHippocampal Gyrus
92.9% overlap with Right Superior Temporal Gyrus (BA 42) 864 57 −29 13 −0.63
5.8% overlap with Right SupraMarginal Gyrus
47.2% overlap with Left Superior Temporal Gyrus (BA 38) 756 −39 6 −12 −0.58
57.7% overlap with Right SupraMarginal Gyrus 729 54 −42 20 0.68
39.9% overlap with Right Superior Temporal Gyrus
The overlap is the percentage of voxels relative to the entire size of the cluster that overlapped with a given region’s spatial map in the AFNI MNI atlas. So, for
example, “47.2% overlap in Left Superior Temporal Gyrus” means 47.2% of the cluster’s entire volume was spatially located in the MNI region outlining the Left
Superior Temporal Gyrus.
by highlighting the role of hMNS in tennis action prediction,
and also reinforce simulation and embodied cognition theories
(Grafton, 2009; Ortigue et al., 2009a, 2010a; Juan et al., 2013;
Mazzarella et al., 2013), which suggest that reactivation of brain
areas involved in own’s motor performance and integration of
past self experiences can facilitate fast and automatic visuo-motor
matching process between what the observer sees and what they
have executed (over and over) in the past.
Furthermore, the specific pattern of activation for correct
IIS (compared to NIIS) suggests that accurate identification of
a server’s ultimate intentions regarding the direction of their
serves operates through top-down processes as it builds on brain
areas that have been previously recruited during observation and
performance (practice) of that serve, adding regions associated
with habit formation, body feature detection and performance.
This interpretation also fits with the positive correlations found
between some of these brain areas and the USTA levels. The
closer the USTA level of the participants was to that of the model
in the video, the more intense the activity was in these brain
regions. To further investigate these correlations between USTA
levels and top-down processes from these brain areas, future stud-
ies could be done with models having very high (expert) vs. very
low (non-expert) USTA levels. Including these models with dif-
ferent USTA levels would allow to dissociate between motor and
visual expertise.
In addition, IIS (compared to NIIS) was characterized by
increased activity in dopaminergic-rich regions (bilateral thala-
mus, right putamen, right insula, and right caudate nucleus)
involved in somatosensory integration, motivation, goal-directed
actions as well as formation habits and procedural memory
(Ashby and Crossley, 2010, 2012). The specific recruitment of
a striatal based procedural memory in the understanding of
intended serves is of particular interest as it reinforces previous
studies highlighting the importance of procedural memory in
embodied cognition and intention understanding (e.g., Altmann
and Trafton, 2002; Grafton, 2009). Because the dorsal parts of
the striatum, such as the caudate and putamen, are innervated
by dopamine coming from both the ventral tegmental area and
substantia nigra and going out to the insula also track rewarding
stimuli of conditioned incentive value, the present results suggest
that the recruitment of the dorsal striatum may be critical for the
convergence between sensorimotor integration experience during
both the practice of a tennis serve and the rewarding experience
of predicting correctly an opponent’s serve during prior matches.
Further studies need to be done to test this hypothesis.
Finally, incorrect trials were associated with a different con-
figuration of brain activation, which may provide clues as to
when intention prediction goes wrong. Although overlapping
areas of activations were observed within the brain areas involved
in basic visual processing and spatial attention, no activation was
observed during incorrect trials in brain areas involved in action
prediction, embodied cognition, and procedural memory. Our
study instead reveals that inaccurate predictions are related to
activation in cortical areas known to be involved in low-level
(bottom-up) computational processes associated with the sense
of agency and self-other distinction as well as high-level processes
such as theory of mind (Decety and Lamm, 2007). Notably, a
specific activation was observed for incorrect trials in the right
TPJ—a heteromodal association cortical area, emcompassing the
supramarginal gyrus, posterior superior temporal gyrus, and the
dorsal part of the occipital gyrus, which is involved both in low-
level computational processes associated with theory of mind,
perspective taking, a sense of agency, and higher social cognitive
tasks (Decety and Lamm, 2007) and self-other distinction (Decety
and Sommerville, 2003; Decety and Lamm, 2007). Further stud-
ies using high temporal resolution imagingmethods (such as high
density electrical neuroimaging) may help delineate the specific
spatio-temporal dynamics of this brain area during inaccurate
predictions of others’ intentions. However, together the results
of our study suggest experienced tennis players may make more
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 781 | 15
Cacioppo et al. Neuroimaging of predicting tennis returns
accurate predictions of the service intentions of a skilled oppo-
nent when they focus on the somatic representation they observe
rather than mentalizing about the strategy and explicit service
intentions of their opponent.
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Movie 1 | IIS stimulus sample. Example of a video clip in which the tennis
player was told the intended location of his serve before he began his
serve preparation.
Movie 2 | NIIS stimulus sample. Example of a video clip in which the
tennis player did not know in advance the location of his serve. Rather the
experimenter told him where to serve when the ball was in the air.
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